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Meet the New Villain, Same as the 
Old Villain 
The New Cold War in American TV, Film and 
Video Games 
Declan E. Cronin ‘19 
The Cold War ended in 1991. But, the American imagination of Russians 
continues to be informed by the Cold War framework. Hollywood movies, in 
particular, played a crucial role in shaping the public perception of the Soviet Union 
as an existential threat to the western way of life. Take for instance the film Rocky 
IV from 1985, which was ostensibly a narrative about the victory of America over 
the Soviet Union, represented through US boxer Rocky Balboa’s win against a 
Soviet boxer Ivan Drago. Rocky IV was not an exception. Throughout the Cold 
War, Russians frequently appeared as villains in many Hollywood movies, who 
were in the end always defeated by the good American heroes.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the subsequent 
rebuilding of the US-Russian relations, one would imagine a gradual disappearance 
of Russians as primary villains from Hollywood movies.1  Especially, in light of new 
threats posed by Islamic Terrorism after 2001. Yet both Hollywood and television 
productions continue to present Russians as bad guys in their narratives. Russians 
as antagonists are as prevalent in Hollywood movies as they were during the height 
of the Cold War.2 The continued ideological construction of Russians as villains has 
since found its way into new media platforms like video games. Russians appear as 
the second and third-most common adversaries (before or after Latin American 
and Middle Eastern terrorists) in fifty-seven bestselling games from 2001-2013.3 At 
the same time, the representations of Russians, as foes in film, television, and video 
games have undergone significant changes since the 1991. 
 
Historiography: Cold War, Yeltsin Era, Putin’s Russia 
 Understanding those changes require a nuanced exploration of different 
but interrelated historical developments. The Cold War divided the world into the 
ideological opposites between the good West and the evil Soviet Union. For 
decades, the New York Times, writing about Soviet actions across the globe,  
 
1 “End of the Soviet Union; Text of Bush’s Address to Nation on Gorbachev’s Resignation,” New York 
Times (New York, NY), December 26, 1991. 
2 Spring 2017 Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Survey, Q17a-g. 74% of Americans saw ISIS as a 
“major threat,” while only 47% responded that Russia’s power and influence was a “major threat.” 
3 Brandon Valeriano and Philip Habel, “Who Are the Enemies? The Visual Framing of Enemies in 
Digital Games,” International Studies Review 18, no. 3 (2016). 
published articles with dramatic headlines like: “Czechoslovakia Invaded by 
Russians”; “Russians Open Fire on Crowds in Prague”; “President Demands 
Explanation for Horrifying Act of Violence”.4 The “orthodox” school of Cold War 
historiography placed the West on a moral high ground against the Soviet Union 
for the entirety of the Cold War. It explained away the cases of Western military 
interventions as examples of the latter defending democracy and freedom.5 After 
1991, the Cold War historiography shifted its focus to understanding the 
implications of the fall of Soviet Union.6 
 Initially, the Western media embraced the Yeltsin era. But, by the first 
decade of the new century, historians and journalists began re-evaluating Yeltsin’s 
rule. They focused on the problems Russia faced under Yeltsin’s presidency. 
Influential works like Godfather of the Kremlin (2000), Oligarchs (2001), and Piratization 
of Russia (2003) shed light on the widespread corruption of the Yeltsin-era. 
Uncontrolled corruption and organized crime as central aspects of the post-Soviet 
Russian society continue to shape the narrative arcs of various literary works on 
Russia. Ben Mezrich’s many best-selling works, some of which have also been 
developed into popular movies like The Social Network and 21, have further aided in 
disseminating such narratives through the mainstream media. 
  When Vladimir Putin assumed power after Yeltsin, Western scholars yet 
again sought to understand the new ruler and the trajectory of Russia under him. In 
2007, Peter Baker and Susan Glasser, Moscow bureau chiefs for the Washington Post,  
published one of the first major works on Putin’s Russia titled, Kremlin Rising. Baker 
and Glasser argued that under Putin’s presidency (2000-2004), Russia moved 
towards authoritarianism with an uncertain future. Apart from Putin’s meticulously 
curated biography titled, First Person, it is hard to find a scholarly and literacy work 
that views Russian through a different lens. All influential works on Putin, such as, 
The Strongman (2011), Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin (2012), The Man Without a Face 
(2012), The New Tsar (2015) draw similar conclusion of him as an authoritarian ruler 
and Russian society further sliding into deeper organized crime under his rule. 
While scholars disagree over Putin’s ultimate goals (self-enrichment, a return to 
Soviet glory, or to undermine the West), they all seem to agree that his political 
ambitions and decisions pose real risk in de-stabilizing the existing international 
order. 
 Notably, in the wake of the Russian annexation of Crimea, scholars and 
politicians alike began describing the Western-Russian relation as “New Cold War.” 
Many argue that the thawing of the conflict after 1991 between the West and 
Russia is hardening again. But, some disagree with the choice of the phrase “New 
 
4 NYT, August 21, 1968; NYT, September 2, 1983. 
5 Edward Crapol, “Some Reflections on the Historiography of the Cold War,” The History Teacher 20, no. 
2 (February 1987): 253-254. 
6 Vojtech Mastny, The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years (New York, NY: Oxford University 
Press, 1998), 3-4. 
Cold War,” to describe the emerging conflicts between Russia and the West.7 They 
particularly argue that it inaccurately conflates two distinct historical periods and 
ideologies  into one. The Cold War was a geopolitical and ideological battle 
between the communist Eastern bloc and the capitalist Western bloc from 1947 till 
1991.  Currently, neither the West nor Russia is involved in a world domination 
based on such ideological differences. Robert Legvold  argues that unlike the Cold 
War, the ‘New Cold War’ does not “pit one ‘ism’ against another”. Rather it is 
largely based on Russia’s perceived alienation from the contemporary West.8 
Despite these conceptual and historical differences, scholars continue to use the 
term “New Cold War’ to describe the ongoing tension between Russian and the 
West.9  
 
The Cold War: A World of Moral Clarity 
Cold War ideology reached the American households through popular 
television shows like The Adventures of Rocky and Bullwinkle and Friends. While films 
also played an important role in propagating the good vs evil narrative, their time 
format of 90 to 120 minutes made them less effective compared to the television 
shows. The latter unrestricted by the time format of a film, reached American living 
rooms for years, allowing viewers regular as well as prolonged opportunity to 
develop opinions on characters. Media philosopher Lars Lundsten calls this power 
of television programming “generated state of affairs.” For example, frequent 
“images of mutilated corpses in Chechnya may serve as ground for condemnation 
of the Enemy or as ground for identification of a remote and suffering nation.”10 
In other words, what viewers experience regularly on screen can have a profound 
impact on how they view the world. In a long-running television show, these 
effects are further amplified. 
The Adventures of Rocky and Bullwinkle and Friends, which aired for five 
seasons from 1959 to 1964, featured two Russian-accented villains named: Boris 
Badenov and Natasha Fatale. Both, Natives of Pottsylvania, a fictitious Eastern-
bloc country, Boris and Natasha were the nemesis of Rocky and Bullwinkle. 
Badenov’s name is a play on the name of late sixteenth century Russian czar called 
Boris Godunov. Over the course of more than one hundred fifty episodes, viewers 
saw the two Russian villains constantly trying to kill the lovable flying squirrel and 
moose and carry out attempts at world domination. It is worth nothing that the 
 
7 Aurel Braun, “Tougher Sanctions Now: Putin’s Delusional Quest for Empire,” World Affairs 177, no. 2 
(July/August 2014). 
8 Robert Legvold, “Managing the New Cold War: What Moscow and Washington Can Learn from the 
Last One,” Foreign Affairs 93, no. 4 (July/August 2014): 75. 
9 Jeffrey Gedmin, “Beyond Crimea: What Vladimir Putin Really Wants,” World Affairs 177, no. 2 
(July/August 2014). 
10 Lars Lundsten, “Modal Ontology of Television: How to Create Social Objects,” The American Journal of 
Economics and Sociology 58, no. 2 (April 1999): 239. 
Russian villains were presented as cartoonish figures. In the immediate aftermath of 
the McCarthyism, the media took a cautious approach in presenting a less militant 
version of Cold War. The cartoonish caricatures of  “diminutive Boris and the 
vampy Natasha” as the face of the looming Soviet threat” convinced the viewing 
audience “that there’s really no need to panic.”11 Yet it was imperative to remind 
American viewers who the enemy was.  
 Cold War-era popular entertainment presented Western audiences with a 
Manichean view of the world in which Russians represented the evil side. The 
Hollywood movies played an equally important role in further propagating such 
worldview. Between 1963 and 1987, Bond franchise films featured Russian 
characters as main villains.12 One of the Russian characters, who appeared in six of 
those seven movies is General Anatol Gogol. As the fictional head of the KGB, 
Gogol embodied was often presented as a stone-cold, conniving and ruthless 
character. Rosa Klebb and General Orlov.  
 The second installment of the Bond franchise also explored the idea of the 
difference, in Western perception, between good violence and bad violence. In 
From Russia With Love, James Bond is pitted against Rosa Klebb, the former head of 
SMERSH (a formal Russian agency used by Ian Fleming in his novels) who 
defected to SPECTRE (the fictional, villainous organization largely used as a 
placeholder for SMERSH in the film series). Klebb, a short-haired, cold woman 
whose rolled R’s are supposed to imply a Russian accent, is equally determined to 
both obtain the Lektor (a decoding device) and kill James Bond. Her signature 
weapon is a lethally-poisoned knife embedded in the toe of her shoe, a Bondesque 
gadget that reveals itself at the end of the movie when Bond narrowly escapes 
laceration at its blade. When Q, MI-6’s own inventor, designs a deadly contraption 
for James Bond, audiences are expected to, and do, marvel at the good guys’ 
ingenuity. Yet, when the villain has their own special weapon, the audience is 
supposed to see its use as illegitimate or cheating in the pursuit of killing Bond. 
Consider the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, where the Soviets secretly installed 
missile bases in Cuba, near the U.S. mainland. This was interpreted as aggressive 
and incendiary by many in America, but the United States had missiles equally close 
in Turkey.13 Rosa Klebb, playing the role of aggressive Russian, is devious in her 
concealment of her poison-tipped shoe knife, but James Bond, as the heroic West, 
is admired for his clever attaché case that conceals knives, a rifle, tear gas, and 
ammunition.  
The political end of Western Cold War rhetoric originated from a place of 
 
11 David Klion, “Russia, Hollywood’s Mirror,” Coda Story, September 2018. 
https://codastory.com/disinformation-crisis/rewriting-history/russia-hollywood-mirror. 
12 From Russia With Love (1963), The Spy Who Loved Me (1977), Moonraker (1979), For Your Eyes Only 
(1981), Octopussy (1983), License to Kill (1985), The Living Daylights (1987). 
13 Mark L. Haas, “Prospect Theory and the Cuban Missile Crisis,” International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 2 
(June 2001): 263-265. 
moral superiority, deeply rooted in the idea that the West sought to restore peace in 
opposition to a belligerent Soviet Union. U.S. President Ronald Reagan, who 
thoroughly enjoyed Tom Clancy’s book The Hunt for Red October, recognized the 
importance of culture during the Cold War. He was also fond of establishing the 
U.S.’s ethical advantage over the USSR. In what has popularly come to be known 
as his “Evil Empire” speech, U.S. President Ronald Reagan clearly outlined the 
moral superiority of the United States as grounded in “the greatness of America in 
you, her people, and in your families, churches, neighborhoods, communities—the 
institutions that foster and nourish values like concern for others and respect for 
the rule of law under God.”14 The last, and most unapologetically evil Russian 
villain in the Bond franchise is General Orlov, who appears in the 1983 film 
Octopussy. Although the movie was released three months after Ronald Reagan’s 
“Evil Empire” speech, so filming took place before Reagan delivered it, Orlov 
captures the view of the USSR and Russia that Reagan perpetuated in his address. 
At the film’s beginning, Orlov attempts to rally the other members of the military 
commissariat to support his proposed full-fledged invasion of the West. 
Representing the Russians as aggressors against peace and stability, Orlov 
challenges the détente that had been in place since the early 1970s. General Gogol, 
thankfully, is there to hold Orlov’s belligerence in check. Gogol, however, 
represents what was but no longer is in Russia—Orlov, it appears, represents what 
is and what may come. Released in 1983, Octopussy was produced around the time 
of the 1980 Summer Olympics boycott, a time when many in America thought that 
the Soviet Union was taking drastically violent and detrimental measures to 
preserve and advance communism around the globe. Reminiscent of General 
Orlov’s push for a large-scale invasion, the major reason for the 1980 boycott was 
the Soviet’s December 1979 invasion of Afghanistan. A Daily News headline in 
January of 1980 emphasized that the “Soviets must leave Afghanistan in a Month” 
to avoid a 50-60 country boycott; the New York Times described, “The War of the 
Games,” stating that “for the games to proceed as if nothing has happened would 
confirm the Soviet Union in its contempt for world opinion—the more so as the 
violence in Afghanistan grimly mounts. A boycott is one of the few ways to reach 
past Pravda with a clear message to the Soviet people.”15 There, the West’s 
perceived moral superiority is confirmed: the U.S. was leading a global charge to 
show the oppressed Soviet people the truth. Orlov’s blind aggression reflects data 
from a Roper poll on “Russia’s primary objectives in world affairs.” In one year, 
from 1979 to 1980, the percentage of Americans that felt “Russia seeks global 
domination and will risk a major war to achieve that domination if it can’t be 
 
14 Ronald Reagan, speech to the National Association of Evangelicals, Orlando, Florida, March 8, 1983. 
15 Daily News (New York, NY), January 21, 1980; “The War of the Games,” NYT, March 28, 1980. 
achieved by other means” jumped from 18% to 39%.16  
 By 1985, American attitudes continued to grow increasingly in favor of 
the view that the USSR was a total aggressor, willing to achieve dominance by any 
necessary means.17 The fourth installment of the Rocky franchise offers the clearest 
black and white portrayal of the Cold War, and U.S.-Russian relations, as a fight 
between good and evil. Ivan Drago, a Russian boxer portrayed by Swedish actor 
Dolph Lundgren, represents all American fears and misgivings about the USSR. 
Before fighting Rocky Balboa in Rocky IV, Drago was an Olympic gold medalist 
(perhaps at the boycotted 1980 Games) and an undefeated (100-0-0 with 100 KO) 
amateur boxer in the USSR. Born in Moscow, Drago was groomed to be a top 
fighter in the world, training with the best machines and technology (compared to 
Rocky, who trained by running up and down the Philadelphia Museum of Art’s 
steps). Director Sylvester Stallone is careful to expose, though, that Drago achieved 
much of his superhuman ability and stature illegitimately via years of anabolic 
steroid use. Essentially a Soviet science experiment, Drago embodies a fear and 
perception that many Americans held: from 1981 to 1990, ABC/Washington Post 
polls on perceived military strength showed that more Americans thought the 
USSR was superior to the U.S. in terms of strength.18 
 Rocky IV’s good-vs-evil motif was built around the idea that the virtuous 
United States, was fighting the behemoth “Evil Empire,” and it was not at all 
subtle. As a New York Times review points out, Sylvester Stallone makes it clear that 
Rocky’s bout with Drago is a Cold War battle of “international diplomacy.”19 
Before fighting Rocky, Drago duels Apollo Creed. Creed, dressed in his stars and 
stripes shorts, is pulverized by his vastly superior opponent. In the end, Drago 
lands a punch to the head that kills Creed; the emotionless Drago’s response to 
Creed’s lifeless body on the canvas: “If he dies, he dies.” When Rocky, the hard 
working, all-American fighter, takes on Drago, the film becomes a pure fight 
between good and evil, between the U.S. and USSR. The ring in which they fight is 
just another in a long line of Cold War proxy battlefields. Not only is Rocky 
defending his fallen friend and countryman, he is fighting for the U.S.’s reputation 
against the goliath Russian who insists that “the defeat of this little so-called 
champion will be an example of how pathetically weak [American] society has 
become.” Drago, the Russian, proves to be the ultimate aggressor, willing to 
achieve victory by any means necessary and at any cost. 
 
Post-USSR Russia: A World Without Laws 
 
16 Tom W. Smith, “The Polls: American Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union and Communism,” The 
Public Opinion Quarterly 47, no. 2 (Summer, 1983): 281. 
17 Roper Poll in Alvin Richman, “Poll Trends: Changing America Attitudes Toward the Soviet Union,” 
The Public Opinion Quarterly 55, no. 1 (Spring 1991): 141-142.  
18 ABC/WP Polls in Richman, “Poll Trends,”143. 
19 Janet Maslin, “Screen: ‘Rocky IV,’ vs. the USSR,” NYT, November 27, 1985. 
 When the Berlin Wall nominally fell on November 9, 1989, four years 
after Rocky IV’s release, it triggered the creation of a vast void. By Christmas Day, 
1991, the Soviet flag was removed from the Kremlin, never to fly again, as the 
white, blue, and red flag of the Russian Federation took its place. What changed for 
Russia was far more than a flag: a massive union of states, along with its 
government, institutions, and infrastructure, had stood one day, and was gone the 
next. Rose Brady, the Moscow bureau chief for Business Week at the time of the 
USSR’s collapse, described how the uncertainty of transition “provided fertile 
ground for organized crime,” as the Russia mafia grew increasingly powerful in the 
early-1990s.20 At the end of January 1996, the head of President Boris Yeltsin’s 
human rights commission, Sergei Kovalev, resigned in disgust. In an open letter 
published domestically and abroad, Kovalev rebuked Yeltsin and Russia’s current 
state. Kovalev expressly noted that “criminals continue to roam freely,” referring to 
the mafia’s accumulating control over the economy and society.21 
 The USSR’s collapse left in its wake a damaged, seemingly lawless Russia 
left to fend for itself. When the command economy ceased to exist, all connections 
were lost. The large majority of the population was subject to the command 
economy, and when it vanished they did not know from whom to buy or to whom 
to sell. According to Marshall Goodman’s book The Piratization of Russia, the mafia 
gained prominence during this time because their system of connections was not 
reliant upon or accountable to the government run, Soviet command economy.22 
Because Russian law-enforcement had virtually no control over Russia in the 1990s, 
the mafia employed extra-legal means of accomplishing their goals.23 As Paul 
Klebnikov explains, murder became their preferred form of doing business: 
“Businessmen, instead of deciding their differences in the market or in court, are 
hiring professional killers and deciding their differences with guns.”24 This rise and 
violence of the Russia mafia did not go unnoticed in the West. As early as 1992, 
American and British press began to cover the growing role of organized crime in 
newly-capitalist Russia. Reestablishing the moral high ground over Russia, articles 
with titles such as “Russia’s New Culture Begins to Emerge from Soviet Rubble,” 
“In Ex-Soviet Lands, Gangs Fill Vacuum,” and “Capitalism gone wild, anarchy and 
crime fire forces of opposition” characterized Russia as a chaotic, lawless hotbed of 
 
20 Rose Brady, Kapitalizm: Russia’s Struggle to Free Its Economy (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1999), 149. 
21 Sergei Kovalev, “The Case Against Yeltsin,” Washington Post, January 29, 1996. 
22 Marshall I. Goldman, The Piratization of Russia: Russian Reform Goes Awry (London: Routledge, 2003), 
170-171. 
23 Anders Asland, How Russia Became a Market Economy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 
1995), 167. 
24 Paul Klebnikov, Godfather of the Kremlin: The Decline of Russia in the Age of Gangster Capitalism (Orlando, 
Florida: Harcourt, 2000), 32. 
criminal activity.25 
 Slowly, with the re-evaluation of Yeltsin’s Russia, the prototype of 
Russian antagonists shifted from an ideological, evil enemy to a morally corrupt 
foe, based on the country’s rise in organized crime. Nowhere is this picture of 
Russian organized crime clearer than in the 2007 film Eastern Promises. Set in 
London, the film explores, as Doris Toumarkine of Film Journal International puts it, 
“a particularly venal branch of the Russian mob…a gang specializing in human 
trafficking, drugs, and killing on a dime (or ruble).”26 The Russian mafia members 
are vory v zakone (thiefs in law), an elite echelon of professional Russian criminals 
born out of Soviet Gulag prison-camps. The vory have always held “hallowed place 
in Russia’s criminal lore,” but recently have gained Western attention. This is in 
part due to their notoriety after their post-Soviet diaspora to Western cities, where 
they continue to engage in crime today, but in a larger sense they have “come to 
symbolize opposition to the country’s often arbitrary political and legal practices.”27 
In Eastern Promises, dialogue between two Vory reveals their contempt for the west, 
as one expresses frustration over the fact that “the Americans…f*****g NATO” 
interfere with their smuggling supply lines from Russia to the West. In a surprising 
plot twist, the protagonist, a newly promoted vor named Nikolai Luzhin, reveals 
himself to be an undercover FSB (Federal Security Service of the Russian 
Federation) agent who has infiltrated the London arm of the mob. With this, 
Eastern Promises establishes that the Russian state is not the enemy; rather, the state 
is attempting to curtail the rampant Russian organized crime, the true adversary, 
both at home and abroad.  
Even in 2014, with the blockbuster hit The Equalizer starring Denzel 
Washington, Western film continued to fall back on the Russian mobster trope that 
was born two decades prior in the 1990s. While still Russians, this model of 
Russian movie villains are enemies because of their moral corruption more so than 
their inherently Russian (or communist) identity, which characterized their Cold 
War counterparts. Like Eastern Promises, The Equalizer features ultra-violent Russian 
mafia members. The two main antagonists, Vladimir Pushkin and Nicolai Itchenko, 
are both reflections of the Western perception of Russia as the land of gangster 
capitalism that was born in the 1990s. As the 1990s progressed, however, 
Americans began to take note that the Russian mafia had extended its reach into 
their cities.28 Both Eastern Promises and The Equalizer take place in major Western 
 
25 John Rockwell, “Russia’s New Culture Begins to Emerge from Soviet Rubble,” NYT, November 11, 
1992; “In Ex-Soviet Lands, Gangs Fill Vacuum,” NYT, October 25, 1992; Michael Brinyon, “Capitalism 
gone wild, anarchy and crime fire forces of opposition,” Times (London, England), October 5, 1993. 
26 Doris Toumarkine, “Eastern Promises,” Film Journal International, September 10, 2007. 
27 Michael Schwirtz, “Vory v Zakone has hallowed place in Russian criminal lore,” July 29, 2008. 
28 Alison Mitchell, “Russian Emigres Importing Thugs to Commit Crimes in U.S.,” NYT, April 11, 
1992; Alan Lupo, “A New Breed of Comrades in Arms,” Boston Globe (Boston, MA), December 10, 
1995. 
metropolises, London and Boston, respectively. Pushkin and Itchenko are not 
ideological enemies or purely evil (although they have few to no redeeming 
qualities), instead the Russians that audiences encounter in The Equalizer are 
mobsters involved in a prostitution ring and other illicit smuggling operations. 
Their end goal, however, is not reprehensible. Unlike Bond villains or the ruthless 
Ivan Drago, these Russian characters are not after world domination. They are not 
confrontational, or trying to disrupt most people’s day-to-day goings-on. At the 
end of the day, Pushkin and Itchenko engage in their criminal activity to make 
money, and while there is nothing inherently wrong with the pursuit of wealth, it is 
how the Russians are willing to make their money where they are at severe fault.  
A New York Times review of The Equalizer written by A. O. Scott calls into 
question where to draw the line on Russian bad guys. “I can’t help feeling a little bit 
sorry for some of the bad guys,” Scott confesses, “not Puskin and [Itchenko]…but 
what about the lower-ranking muscle, the bald dudes with tattoos who have to 
open the doors of the black S.U.V.s and throw first punches at a man they have no 
way of knowing is really an elite super-assassin? Were they warned about this in the 
job interview? Do they have health insurance? They’re really just working stiffs, 
too, and the way they’re treated seems a little unfair.”29 With his tongue-in-cheek 
commentary on how some Russian villains are worse than others, Scott plays the 
role of judge, arbitrating from his place of ethical high ground. It appears, then, 
that while portrayals of Russian antagonists changed from the Cold War to post-
Soviet-era, the Western assertion of moral superiority reigned on. 
 
New Cold War: Same as the Old One? 
 The New Cold War, a term recently coined by scholars to describe current 
affairs, must be framed differently than the original Cold War. Nonetheless, its use 
has benefits, especially when referring to the various secondary battlefields that are 
active today. In recent years, a new kind of Russian adversary has been developed 
in the West due to more palpable fears regarding Russia. While the Russian mob is 
real and certainly active around the globe, Westerners are beginning to see a 
different side of Russia as the largest threat. In fact, what has changed since 
Russia’s heyday as the home of organized crime and mafia violence is that 
Americans view Russia as a more genuine enemy. From 1999 to 2018, the 
percentage of Americans that saw Russia as an enemy rose from 5% to 29%.30 
Today, while ISIS is perceived as the greatest danger to national security, nearly half 
of Americans see Russia as a threat to the United States.31 This is because 
Americans have observed Russia's actions on the world stage in places like Georgia 
 
29 A. O. Scott, “The Equalizer: Heroically Handy With a Corkscrew,” NYT, September 25, 2014. 
30 Gallup Poll, “Please say whether you consider Russia an ally of the United Siaes, friendly, but not an 
ally, unfriendly, or an enemy of the United States,” April 1999-July 2018. 
31 Spring 2017 Pew Global Attitudes Survey, Q17c. 
and Ukraine as well as on American soil, with the 2016 presidential election. The 
Putin-led Russia emerging in the world over the last decade has shown that it is not 
afraid to flex its military muscles and exert brute force to achieve its objectives. The 
new Cold War in which many argue the U.S. and Russia are engaged is rooted, in 
no small part, in the rise of tensions over Russian military actions in ex-Union 
Republics. In August of 2008, U.S. President George W. Bush stated that Russian 
invasion of Georgia was “unacceptable in the 21st century” and “jeopardize[d]” its 
relationship with the West.32 Six years later, NATO Deputy Secretary General 
Alexander Vershbow stated that “[NATO] must begin to view Russia no longer as 
a partner, but more as an adversary.”33  
 In addition to thousands of deaths and tens of thousands of civilian 
casualties, Russia has extended its reach and will via a different kind of warfare. In 
the mid-2000s, Russia began utilizing cyberwarfare internationally. Before invading 
Georgia with military units on the ground, Russia launched cyberattacks on 
Georgian servers and both the Georgian President, Mikheil Saakashvili, and 
National Bank of Georgia’s personal websites.34 Similar attacks were carried out in 
Estonia in 2007. According to Brian Mazanec, an Acting Director with the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office’s International Affairs and Trade team, based 
on Russia’s repeated denial of service (D.D.O.S.) cyberattacks on civilians, 
“Russia’s early cyberwarfare activity…indicate that it is largely unconstrained by 
restrictive cyber norms and is preparing to use cyberweapons in a wide range of 
conflicts and against a variety of targets.”35 In 2011, largely in response to Russian 
use to cyberwarfare, the Pentagon constituted cyberattacks against the United 
States as potential acts-of-war.36  
 Russian cyberwarfare has not been limited to Eastern Europe, though, 
and in 2016 the United States experienced the effect of Russia’s newfound method 
of nonmilitary attacks. In January of 2017, the United States Intelligence 
Community found that Russia had interfered in the previous year’s presidential 
election. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence stated that Vladimir 
Putin had ordered the use of “cyber tools and media campaigns to influence US 
public opinion.”37 The campaign launched against the United States was 
unfortunately just another attack in a string of non-linear offensives that the 
Kremlin has launched in recent years. Recently, journalists have begun to group 
 
32 “Moscow threatens Georgia regime, says Bush,” Financial Times (London), August 12, 2008. 
33 Martin Matishak, “NATO Diplomat: Russia now more an ‘adversary’ than an ally,” The Hill 
(Washington, D.C.), May 1, 2014. 
34 John Markoff, “Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks,” NYT, August 12, 2008. 
35 Ibid.; Brian M. Mazanec, “Why International Order in Cyberspace Is Not Inevitable,” Strategic Studies 
Quarterly 9, no. 2 (Summer 2015): 87. 
36 Siobhan Gorman and Julian E. Barnes, “Cyber Combat: Act of War, Pentagon Sets Stage for U.S. to 
Respond to Computer Sabotage with Military Force,” Wall Street Journal (New York, NY), May 31, 2011. 
37 United States Office of the Director of National Intelligence, “Intelligence Community Assessment 
2017-01D,” January 6, 2017.  
this new hybrid, nonmilitary warfare under the umbrella of what many are calling 
the Gerasimov Doctrine. Named for General Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the 
General Staff of the Russia Armed Forces and first Deputy Defense Minister, the 
phrase originated after a 2000-word article, “The Value of Science Is in the 
Foresight,” published by Gerasimov in 2013. In 2017, Molly McKew summed up 
the doctrine in an article for Newsweek, establishing it as “a vision of total warfare 
that places politics and war within the same spectrum of activities…guerrilla, and 
waged on all fronts with a range of actors and tools—for example, hackers, media, 
businessmen, leaks, and, yes, fake news.”38 While the Gerasimov Doctrine covers a 
wide range of methods, it is generally acknowledged that Russia is a demonstrable 
technological threat to those the Kremlin perceives as adversaries. 
 Even the Marvel comic universe has picked up on Western fear of 
Russia’s capacity for and willingness to engage in technological warfare. In Iron Man 
2, a 2010 blockbuster hit that made over $623 million at the box office, audiences 
encountered a vengeful Russian engineer, Ivan Vanko. Played by Mickey Rourke, 
Vanko is oftentimes cold and machine-like. Vanko is an interesting Russian 
adversary, because he essentially does the same things as all the American 
characters, designing a suit and drones that are superior to protagonist Tony 
Stark’s. Nonetheless, Vanko represents a cyber and technological threat to security 
in the movie. As a representation of the new breed of Russian antagonists, Vanko 
is not an ideologically motivated villain; rather he is even humanized by his 
vengeful motivation for violence. Vanko’s subtle humanization through a universal 
influence—revenge—is the result of the deliberate intentions of both actor Mickey 
Rourke and director Jon Favreau, who wished to avoid the character becoming a 
one-dimensional villain.39 While Vanko’s thirst for revenge stems from Stark’s role 
in his father’s deportation, which led to his death at the hands of the Soviet Union, 
Russia may have its own grounds for revenge against the United States.  
 Russian President Vladimir Putin is fond of emphasizing the victimization 
of Russia at the hands of the United States during the 1990s. James Goldgeier, a 
professor of international relations at American University’s School of 
International Service, elucidated Putin’s contempt for the United States’ role in 
Russia’s restructuring after the fall of the Soviet Union: “[Putin] sees the 1990s as 
one long period of humiliation.”40 To Putin, the U.S. was too deeply involved in 
Russia and dictated events far too often in the 1990s, and it has been a goal of his 
to re-establish Russia as a major, respected global power. In a speech made after 
the annexation of Crimea, Putin demanded that the world “accept the obvious fact: 
Russia is an independent, active participant in international affairs; like other 
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countries, it has its own national interests that need to be taken into account and 
respected.”41 In many ways, Vanko perfectly embodies this notion: he displays not 
only technological proficiency, but also brute force without restraint, justified by 
serving his own interests and carrying out his personal revenge. 
Just as Russian film antagonists’ nature changed from the Cold War-era to 
the 21st century, Russian enemies’ portrayal on television has similarly transformed. 
Since the show’s premier in 2013, The Americans has been telling Cold War spy 
stories from a Russian perspective, offering a nuanced and unique insight on 
foreign agents carrying out espionage on American soil.42 The Americans follows the 
story of two Soviet KGB spies, Elizabeth and Philip Jennings, living in the 
Washington D.C. area with their family during Ronald Reagan’s presidency. Filmed 
in the 21st century, but set during the Cold War, the show is offering a new, current 
day take, on Russia through a historical lens. Elizabeth and Philip’s characters are 
extremely complex and call a lot of prior notions into question. Through the 
medium of television, creator Joe Weisberg develops Elizabeth and Philip more 
methodically than he would have been able to in cinematic format. As Russian 
spies living in the United States, the two KGB agents lead very normal American 
lives. Their deep-cover makes them appear, even to their FBI counterintelligence 
agent neighbor, American. On the surface, there is no difference between Elizabeth 
and Philip, two Soviet agents, and any other American citizens. In that way, the 
show humanizes the West’s Cold War—and arguably present day—adversary by 
asking a question: really how different are our enemies from us?  
In the moment Elizabeth and Philip garner sympathy from their 
American audience, however, the show reminds viewers that they are Russian 
agents and, more importantly, the enemy. The two do unspeakably brutal and 
violent things with little remorse. Elizabeth and Philip are, though, multifaceted 
characters. Elizabeth is very much the hardline Soviet operative who is completely 
bought in on the idea that the USSR is good and America is pure evil. Philip, on 
the other hand, enjoys his life in America and admits that it is far better than 
anything Russia can offer. The Americans is fond of reminding, or reassuring, their 
American audience that the U.S. is superior both morally and materially to the 
USSR, despite their intricate humanization of two Soviet spies.  
The Americans very intricately blurs the lines between friend and foe, 
calling the previously accepted bi-polar morality of the Cold War into question. 
Elizabeth and Philip, in The Americans, are shown to be a cog in the Soviet machine. 
They are Russian spies, but they are people. Even though Elizabeth is a staunch 
communist with numerous ideological misgivings about America, she is 
 
41 Masha Lipman, “How Putin Plays with the Law,” The New Yorker (New York, NY), March 19, 2014.  
42 I refer to Elizabeth and Philip Jennings as “antagonists” because, despite being the main characters of 
The Americans, they are KGB agents carrying out covert actions against the United States in a U.S. 
television show. 
nonetheless capable of living in Virginia and raising an American family. Whereas 
during the Cold War The Americans would have focused on the KGB and Soviet 
element of Elizabeth and Philip’s story, in the 21st century the show focuses on 
them as people. Similarly, in The Equalizer, despite their awful ways of making 
money, audiences must acknowledge that the Russian characters’ goals are not that 
unlike their own. What has changed most about American representations of 
Russian characters is their end goals. During the Cold War, Russians were often 
portrayed as more dramatic, ideological enemies. In the context of a global conflict 
between the capitalist West and communist USSR, Russian antagonists’ end goals 
were evil and reprehensible. Now, in a post-Cold War-era, what the Russian 
characters want is not the issue; the problem has become how they go about 
getting what they want.  
 Today, America and Russia, and each country’s leadership, are both 
judged by many to be morally compromised. The U.S. is still the triumphant, more 
popular global power, but the difference between Russian and U.S. favorability, 
worldwide, is not as black and white as it once was. The United States’ global image 
is weakening, and weakening quickly. In 2017, drawing on data from 33 polled 
countries, the U.S.’s favorability stood at 50%, a 14% drop from the same polls 
conducted in 2014-16.43 While the U.S.’s edge on global favorability is shrinking, it 
is still good enough for a narrow first-place lead over second-place China (at 48%) 
and a swiftly dwindling margin over third-place Russia (35%) in 2017 statistics. As 
the lines blur between the once-righteous-superpower United States and once-
deplorable Russia, American media has understandably adjusted its portrayal of 
Russians.  
 In addition to portraying modern-day Russian characters as morally 
corrupt, video game developers and designers have added another nuanced 
approached to Russia in the 21st century. One of the bestselling and most popular 
video games of the 21st century, Call of Duty: Modern Warfare, pits the user against 
current-day Russian ultranationalist enemies in its campaign game mode. In the 
2007 game’s campaign story, a major plotline is the rise of the Russian 
ultranationalist movement. At the game’s outset, a civil war breaks out between a 
failing Russian Federation government and the ultranationalists, who seek to 
restore Russia to Soviet-era glory. The ultranationalists are led by Imran Zakhaev, 
the game’s main antagonist. Nationalism is on the rise in Russia today, and Modern 
Warfare essentially expounds the movement in the form of a violent militant group 
led by a nuclear arms-crazed revolutionary. While the game’s story is fictional, it 
touches nonetheless on the rising Russian nationalism that the West has 
undoubtedly recognized in the 21st century.  
 According to the 13th Prime Minister of Ukraine, Arseniy Yatsenyuk, 
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recent actions by Russia have reinforced his fear that “Vladimir Putin is trying to 
restore the Soviet Union.”44 Consistent with recent data compiled by Pål Kolstø 
and Helge Blakkisrud, two forms of nationalism are on the rise in Russia—ethno-
nationalism and imperial nationalism. Imperial nationalism, in Russia, is tied to the 
growing perception that Russia is no longer a part of Europe.45 Russians, now more 
than ever, view themselves as their “own civilization.” The escalation of ethno-
nationalism, however, complicates matters for the Kremlin. Ethno-nationalism is 
gaining traction due to factors such as illegal immigration from the South Caucuses, 
and may trace its roots back to Soviet times, when “Russia became a state 
dominated by ethnic Russians.”46 The 2014 annexation of Crimea, it appears, 
helped the Kremlin corral the ethnonationalists, focusing nationalism primarily on 
the state and its strength: “the annexation of Crimea allowed Putin to ride two 
horses: since the population of the peninsula is primarily ethnic Russians it was 
possible to present this act both as an ingathering of Russian lands in a strong 
Russian state and as a defence [sic] of ethnic Russians abroad.”47 The tides of 
nationalism are, nonetheless, forcing contradictions and tensions to the surface in 
Russia. A new dimension to American perception may be that Russia is dealing 
with a lot of internal problems, and, while they still might pose an opaque threat to 
us, their government certainly has a lot on its hands with internal affairs.  
 Modern Warfare is important because it takes place in the present and deals 
with Russia, the country. Players encounter Russian army enemies more than 
individual Russian characters in this commentary on 21st century Russia. In Modern 
Warfare 2 and Modern Warfare 3, the ultranationalists seize control of the Russian 
Federation and launch terrorist attacks across the globe, including a mass shooting 
in a Moscow airport. Vladimir Makarov, the ex-KGB operative who carries out the 
shooting does so with the aid of an undercover CIA agent. Aware of the CIA 
operative’s identity, Makarov kills him and leaves his body in the airport as 
evidence that the event was U.S.-sponsored. At the end of Modern Warfare 2, 
Ultranationalist-led Russia declares war on and invades the United States. Modern 
Warfare 3 opens up in New York City, where the Russian forces have almost 
completely taken control of the U.S.’s largest city. As video games play a major role 
in attitude formation, millions of people fighting against modern-day Russian 
enemies on their Xboxes or PlayStations will have an impact on how they view 
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Russia in real life.48 Again, culture and politics share a two-way street. 
 
The Villain Speaks 
 The fact that Western media has persisted in their use of Russian 
adversaries has not been lost on the Kremlin. In Russia, President Vladimir Putin’s 
reactions to the Western trope have varied in recent years. As for various forms of 
global demonization of Russia that Putin perceives, he has made fun of it, 
embraced it, and at times angrily rejected it.  
Putin has admittedly become more comfortable with gently joking at his 
own regime and country’s expense in efforts to degrade his international rivals. 
Take, for example, the Russian primetime television show, Once Upon a Time in 
Russia. In state-sanctioned political humor, the only permissible program of its 
nature, Putin is portrayed as a slightly devious character. The show “pokes fun at 
contemporary Russian life, but in a way that justifies rather than attacks the 
country’s widespread corruption.”49 In essence, Putin is acknowledging that outside 
media will criticize various parts of his regime and state, and an effective way of 
combatting this is to channel it into self-deprecation and own a little part of it. So, 
while the West criticizes his country’s corruption and prevalence of organized 
crime by making the sex-trafficking mafia thugs in Eastern Promises or The Equalizer 
Russian, Putin acknowledges the same issue by dousing it in comedy.  
 While American media seems fixated on providing commentary on Russia 
in movies and television shows, perhaps no one is more fixated on providing 
commentary on Russia in movies and television shows than Russia itself. Putin and 
the Kremlin are no strangers to using state-produced films and shows to their 
benefit. Oftentimes used to draw the nation’s attention away from negative 
realities, as Moscow reporter for the Washington Post Amie Ferris-Rotman asserts, 
Russian television shows are hugely popular and used by the Kremlin to push a 
pro-Putin regime agenda.50 Additionally, the Kremlin uses comedy shows to 
propagate criticism of foreign countries and their leaders. In addition to the 
bumbling Donald Trump impersonator on Comedy Club, other state-run programs 
use satire to bolster the Putin regime and disparage the West. In 2017, the NATO 
Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence released a 157-page report on 
Russian state-sponsored comedy shows. NATO StratCom COE’s report used a 
case study, the show KVN, a national comedy competition as an example of “a 
ready-to-act tool of strategic political communication” through its “special 
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relationship with the Kremlin.”51  
 The humor on KVN is intricately crafted to both allow some concessions 
on Russia’s part while further legitimizing Putin’s Russia and degrading America 
and the West. KVN tackles many of the issues that the West raises against it, while 
putting its own spin on them. Once such case involves the West’s criticism of 
Russia for homophobic legislation. In a 2015 episode of KVN, a large rainbow U.S. 
flag came up on the screen and Russian comedians quipped that “the best country 
in the world is where it will be possible to marry a plant.”52 In this segment, the 
Kremlin-backed KVN essentially took on the West’s criticism, acknowledged it, but 
then turned it on them, making their acceptance and open-mindedness seem like 
the absurd thing. Additionally, KVN is fond of comparing Putin to other world 
leaders, especially American presidents. In 2015, photos of U.S. President Barack 
Obama and Putin were shown side by side: President Obama riding a bike, polo 
tucked into his khaki shorts, next to Putin, shirtless on a bear. KVN does not shy 
away, however, from poking fun at Russia’s own government—yet, it is always for 
the larger mission of legitimizing some area of the Putin regime. In one episode, 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergey Lavrov appeared and read his reaction 
to post-Crimea annexation sanctions. While the words he spoke were serious, the 
way he did so was “overtly sexual, demonstrating that the sanctions against Russia 
were totally inconsequential, that Russia was standing above them.”53 
 In addition to poking fun at Western criticism and villainization of Russia, 
another way in which Russia has adopted Western portrayals of Russians, especially 
in film and television, is through an embrace of the femme fatale character. The femme 
fatale, a woman whose seduction ensnares her lover-victims, has been a constant 
staple of Western renderings of Russian women since the Cold War. In Rocky and 
Bullwinkle, the female Pottsylvanian’s name, Natasha Fatale, is a not-so-subtle nod 
to this notion. The Bond films, however, are where femme fatales get their most 
screen time. For decades, Western audiences met various females who, by lowering 
007’s guard through seduction, manage to make attempts on James Bond’s life. For 
example, in From Russia With Love, Tatiana Romanova lures Bond from their first 
meeting, telling him “you’re even nicer than your photograph,” to which Bond 
replies, “you’re the most beautiful girl I’ve ever seen.” From their first exchange to 
her naked waltz across Bond’s hotel room, Romanova sets up Bond to be 
entrapped by her commanding officer, Rosa Klebb. Even 21st century television 
shows as complex as The Americans have not separated from the femme fatale 
characterization of Russian women. Less than two minutes into The Americans’ first 
episode, audiences witness Elizabeth Jennings’ seduction of an FBI bureaucrat for 
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information.  
 Russia enthusiastically embraced the idea of a Russian femme fatale in 2010, 
when thousands of fans gave Angelina Jolie the reception of a lifetime at the 
Moscow premier of Salt.54 Salt, which was released in English and Russian and 
interestingly features both a character named Orlov and a shoe-knife, follows the 
story of a CIA agent who is accused of being a Russian spy. The truth is, however, 
that Salt is a Russian spy, a part of a Cold War-era sleeper cell. Interestingly, the Salt 
character that thousands of Russian fans rallied around was selected to kill the 
President of the United States. Named the “sexiest woman alive” in 2004 by 
Esquire, Jolie’s portrayal of Salt embodies the idea of a femme fatale character. In the 
same year as Salt’s release, though, the Russian public and the Kremlin celebrated a 
femme fatale who existed outside of Hollywood, in the form what The Week called the 
“real-life” Salt.55 
 In June of 2010, eleven Russian sleeper agents, members of the Illegals 
program, were arrested, accused of “gathering information on American policy and 
politics.”56 Essentially the inspiration for Philip and Elizabeth Jennings from The 
Americans, the Illegals operated in the United States without diplomatic cover, 
assuming everyday identities and embedding themselves nondescriptly in various 
communities. One member of the program, Anna Chapman, gained prominence as 
many in the U.S. saw her fit the femme fatale mold perfectly. In an interview with 
CNN, independent producer John Palacio described how Chapman “understood 
the power of her sexuality.”57 On July 9, Chapman and the other Illegals were 
exchanged for prisoners held by Russia, and sent back to their homeland. Upon her 
arrival to Russia, Chapman was immediately celebrated and rose to fame virtually 
overnight. Chapman was personally invited to the Moscow premier of Salt by 
Angelina Jolie. Additionally, Russia has embraced her femme fatale persona, as she 
has launched an acting and modeling career in recent years: “unlike her more 
obscure colleagues, Ms. Chapman, 28, has welcomed the spotlight. She has become 
a darling of the tabloids, appearing in racy photo spreads, one of which recently 
involved her posing with a pistol.”58 Vladimir Putin, who welcomed the Illegals 
back home by singing patriotic songs, is certainly aware of how Russia can spin and 
weaponize Chapman’s femme fatale side on the global stage. 
 Aside from turning Western depictions of Russia into comedic bits to 
lessen their blow or embracing them head on, Putin’s regime has, at times, angrily 
rejected the West’s criticism. When Russian politician and former KGB operative 
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Nikolai Patrushev remarked that “US policy became reminiscent of the Cold War” 
in 2014, he did not refer to the West’s portrayal of Russian antagonists in movies 
and television shows.59 Instead, he referred to the U.S.’s reaction to Russia’s 
annexation of the Crimean Peninsula and other military incursions into Ukraine—
something that was certainly reflected in Western characterizations of Russia. As a 
member of Putin’s inner circle, Patrushev’s interpretation of the current U.S.-
Russian relationship likely lends insight into the mainstream opinion of those at the 
top. Putin, adept at painting Russia as the innocent victim of Western hypocrisy, 
has often negatively reacted to how the West continues to see Russia as an 
adversary. In terms of Russian action in Crimea, Putin wielded this rhetoric: “they 
like us only when we are poor and standing there with a beggar’s bowl…As soon as 
we start talking about our interests and they start feeling some element of 
geopolitical competition, well, they don’t like that.”60  
 Putin’s outrage often stems largely from a feeling of exclusion from the 
West, his contempt for NATO, and his perception of spreading Russophobia. 
While Western perpetuation of Russian adversaries may seem benign to some, to 
Putin is a sign of increasing global ostracization of Russia. In a June 2017 interview 
with Oliver Stone, Putin’s emotions ran high when he asserted: “There is no more 
Soviet Union, no Eastern Bloc. In my view, NATO needs an external enemy to 
justify its existence, so there is a constant search for one, and provocations to 
create adversaries where there are none.” For Putin, Russia has become the external 
enemy whose preservation as antagonist is vital to Western stability.61  
 
What Now? 
In 2019, battles are unquestionably being waged between Russia and the 
West. While the us vs. them motif may still score a win at the box office, though, 
our culture is lagging behind the geopolitical reality of today. The Cold War days of 
black and white polar opposition seem far behind us, as lines between friends and 
enemies begin to blur. Granted, Russian undertakings of recent memory, from 
actions in Ukraine and Syria to granting Edward Snowden asylum, have been in 
direct opposition to Western aims and interests. In light of new, larger threats and 
shifting global dynamics, however, the Russian villain cliché seems to have lost its 
Cold War gusto.62 The New Cold War has indubitably brought about a new 
Russian antagonist prototype in Western media, but the villain remains, 
nonetheless, Russian. The familiarity of a decade-old enemy—and one that 
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conveniently continues to justify its evolving, but steadfast, role as villain—may 
have done just enough to keep the Russian antagonist in Western cinema, 
television, and the newer video game market.  
New Cold War battlefields exist today on household televisions, in movie 
theaters, and on mobile phones—they inescapably surround us, oftentimes without 
our conscious awareness of their presence. While much of our culture clings to the 
past, we are slowly beginning to come to terms with the complex nature of a world 
in which we are not sure where our greatest enemies reside. In the coming years, it 
will be interesting to witness where the entertainment industry settles. Will the 
Russian villain hold strong, or will another take its place? In recent years, countless 
journalists have called attention to the film industry’s persistent enemy. When will 
their realization inspire a reevaluation from those within the realm of 
entertainment? Perhaps soon. Today, given the world’s current course, change 
looms. Culture is vital, and its place cannot be overlooked. Our portrayal of 
adversaries is of the utmost significance because it is a method through which to 
channel a deeper set of beliefs, of not only why our adversaries are the bad guys, 
but, perhaps more importantly, of why we should be the good guys. 
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